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What's "Appropriate"?: Finding a Voice for
Deaf Children and Their Parents in the
Education for All Handicapped
Children Act
I. INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1975, the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (EAHCA or the Act)' has given rise to
substantial litigation between the parents of handicapped chil-
dren and local and state school authorities.2 Some of the most
difficult EAHCA cases have involved the education of deaf
children.3 In fact, certain underlying premises of the Act, such
as the protection of civil rights of handicapped students, have
caused an implementation often at odds with the needs of indi-
vidual children.4 In addition to its avowed purpose of provid-
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et. seq. (1982)
It is the purpose of this Act to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them ... a free appropriate public education which emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians
are protected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all
handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate handicapped children.
Id. at § 1400(c).
2. Hill, Legal Conflicts in Special Education: How Competing Paradigms in the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act Create Litigation, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 129
(1986). In addition, such litigation has spawned a topical reporter, the EDUCATION FOR
THE HANDICAPPED LAw REPORT (EHLR). Hill, supra, at 129 n.2.
3. The leading case interpreting the EAHCA is Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick
Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 175 (1982). The Rowley court
considered the educational resources to which an eight-year-old deaf child was entitled
under the EAHCA. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
4. In part, the EAHCA was intended to preclude segregation for its own sake.
Congress found that a significant number of handicapped students were excluded from
public schools and separated from their peers throughout the educational process. 20
U.S.C. § 1400 (b)(4).
An implicit assumption of the EAHCA seems to be that segregated settings are
inherently unfair. See C. Ramsey, The Political Cultural and Ideological Context of
Mainstreaming Since PL 94-142, UNITED STATES/SPAIN JOINT SEMINAR ON DEAF
CHILDREN IN INTEGRATED EDUCATIONAL SETrINGS, GALLAuDET U. RES. INST. at 11
(1988) (in press).
[Tjhe broadness of the law, by necessity, left many crucial issues unaddressed.
The most serious result is that the civil and educational rights of handicapped
people ... get confused with specific educational needs. Various groups of
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ing a free appropriate public education, the Act requires that
"to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children...
are educated with children who are not handicapped .......
This desire for integration has been labeled "least restrictive
environment" by the U.S. Department of Education, the
agency responsible for implementing the EAHCA,6 and is
often referred to as "mainstreaming."7 The attempt to balance
the competing notions of "appropriate" and "least restrictive"
is the source of much of the conflict between litigants in
EAHCA cases.
In the case of deaf children, whose needs are both unique
and varied, the consequences are particularly acute.8 Under
the EAHCA as it has been implemented by the states and
interpreted by the courts, deaf children are often denied what
the EAHCA was intended to give them-a free appropriate
public education.' Parents of deaf students are anguished and
frustrated with a system that, however well-intentioned, fails
to provide an adequate learning environment for their
children.10
handicapped children are collapsed into one class of person on the grounds
that they have an identical need for civil rights protections....
Id. at 8.
5. 20 U.S.C. at § 1412(5)(B).
6. See 34 C.F.R. § § 300.550-.556 (1988).
7. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176 at 216 (1982); DuBow, "Into the Turbulent Mainstream"-A Legal Perspective on
the Weight to be Given to the Least Restrictive Environment in Placement Decisions
for Deaf Children, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 215 (1989) [hereinafter Dubow, Turbulent
Mainstream].
8. In order to foster improved educational opportunities for deaf individuals,
Congress created the Commission on Education of the Deaf in 1986. 20 U.S.C. § 4301.
Among the findings in its report to Congress, the Commission noted that, in spite of an
increased preference for educating deaf students in regular classes, only about half of
the students placed in local public schools are academically integrated. COMMISSION ON
EDUCATION OF THE DEAF, TOWARD EQUALITY: EDUCATION OF THE DEAF 12-13 (1988)
[hereinafter COMMISSION].
The Commission sets forth factors that distinguish deaf students from other
handicapped students seeking a free and appropriate public education, including.
(1) Many deaf children enter school without a competent language base, making
the acquisition of language very difficult. Id. at 16-17.
(2) Many deaf children are isolated from the social discourse of the classroom,
which is another major obstacle in acquiring language. Id. at 16.
9. CoMMISsioN, supra note 8; DuBow, Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7.
10. Some parents expressed their frustrations to the Commission by describing
their childrens' classroom experiences:
We found that 'appropriate' meant, at best, 'adequate.' 'Good enough.' Not too
costly, and not too troublesome. We found that, for our children who could
not hear, 'appropriate' meant placement in a classroom with children who
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In applying the Act to educational placements of deaf chil-
dren, courts have deferred consistently to educators as experts,
even when they are not required to do so and even when it is
unclear that the school has made an effort to meet an individ-
ual child's educational needs."x Although courts may be well-
intentioned, such an approach fails to afford deaf children and
their parents the "free appropriate public education" that Con-
gress intended. When parents and teachers cannot agree,
rather than defer to the expertise of school officials, courts
must make some independent assessment of a child's proce-
dural rights under the Act in light of that child's need. Other-
wise, school officials may freely assess the child's need in light
of their own resources, a result not intended by Congress. 2
This Comment will present some of the impacts that pre-
vious court decisions have had on deaf children and will pro-
vide background on the educational, cultural, and social
implications to deaf children of the choice of communication
methodology' 3- language. This background is essential to an
understanding of deaf education, for nothing is more central to
learning than language. Likewise, language is central to accul-
turation and to socialization. 4 A decision that imposes a par-
ticular communication methodology on a child and her family
cannot be made lightly, because that decision has an impact
that reaches beyond her daily life into her future. To be sure,
schools have limited resources and cannot provide unlimited
choices. However, schools should not be allowed to choose the
could hear. 'Appropriate' meant a few hours a day with a teacher minimally
qualified to teach deaf children. 'Appropriate' meant depending on a poorly
qualified sign language interpreter six hours a day. 'Appropriate' meant being
the only kid in your class with your very own grown-up hanging on your heels
all day long .... 'Appropriate' meant growing up not knowing you were part
of a community of deaf people. Growing up thinking that upon graduation
you would somehow become hearing--after all, you'd never seen a deaf
adult.. . . 'Appropriate' meant not expecting too much.... Not trying things
that teachers 'knew' deaf kids couldn't do. Not making waves. Not disrupting
the system. In short, we found that appropriate meant letting our kids in the
schoolhouse door. But not assuring they learned anything once inside.
Statement to the Commission on Education of the Deaf by M. Cassidy and S. Harvey
(March 17, 1987), COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 19 (emphasis in original).
11. See Hill, supra note 2, at 164-5. This procedural approach may address equality
of treatment, but leaves aside questions of effect.
12. See id. at 139-140.
13. "Communication methodology" as used in this Comment refers to the means
that teachers and deaf students use to communicate in the classroom.
14. See, e.g., C. CAZDEN, CLASSROOM DISCOURSE: THE LANGUAGE OF TEACHING
AND LEARNING (1988).
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communication method used for teaching a deaf child or deaf
children solely for their own convenience. When a deaf child
and her parents are disturbed enough to challenge such a deci-
sion, courts should respond by at least satisfying themselves
that the child's individual needs are met.
This Comment explores a significant impact of the
EAHCA on deaf children, the inability of such children and
their parents to have an effective voice in identifying their own
educational needs. This Comment argues that the courts
should defend the rights of deaf children and their parents to
play a meaningful role in defining and effecting an appropriate
education for their children and ensuring that the children's
educational needs are met. The Supreme Court has in fact rec-
ognized that Congress intended parents to play such a role. 5
Initially, the Comment briefly reviews the EAHCA's pur-
pose and its legislative history, and describes the workings of
its administrative procedures.'" The Comment then examines
the seminal case interpreting the EAHCA, Board of Education
v. Rowley,'7 as it applies to the parents' role in a deaf child's
education."" This section of the Comment also explores the
meaning currently given to "free appropriate education" and
"least restrictive environment" (LRE), as well as the natural,
and possibly irresolvable, tension between these requirements.
Against this background, Section III of this Comment then
sets out the Act's unique impact on deaf children. This impact
is caused not only by the characteristics of the children them-
selves, but by factors such as the small population of deaf chil-
dren and limitations on public resources. In addition, the
Comment identifies, at least partially, the potential signifi-
15. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324 (1987).
16. The procedures themselves have substantial significance for achieving
individual goals under the Act. For a thorough analysis of the implications of the Act's
procedural provisions, see Guernsey, When the Teachers and Parents Can't Agree, Who
Really Decides? Burdens of Proof and Standards of Review Under the Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 67 (1988).
17. 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
18. Rowley has been widely examined in the literature. See, e.g., DuBow, Special
Education Law Since Rowley, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1001 (1984); Note, Rowley and
Educational Opportunities for the Handicapped, 8 J. Juv. L. 95 (1984); C. Broadwell &
J. Walden, "Free Appropriate Public Education" ufter Rowley: An Analysis of Recent
Court Decisions, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 35 (1988); Comment, The Meaning of Appropriate
Education to Handicapped Children Under The EHCA: The Impact of Rowley, 14 Sw.
U. L. REv. 521 (1984); Note, Attack on the EHA: The Education for All Handicapped
Children Act After Board of Education v. Rowley, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 183
(1983) [hereinafter Attack on the EHA].
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cance of choices of educational and communication methodol-
ogy for deaf students and their parents.
Finally, Section IV examines how recent federal court
decisions, by substantially deferring to school authorities, have
effectively disenfranchised deaf children and their parents as
both participants and beneficiaries of the EAHCA.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE EAHCA
A. Purpose of the Act
1. Legislative History
Several factors played key roles in the enactment of the
EAHCA. Among these were developing trends in special edu-
cation, pressure from parents and educators, and two landmark
decisions in 1972. From the late sixties, segregated education
of moderately or mildly handicapped children began to fall
into disfavor, and experts began supporting the education of
handicapped and nonhandicapped children in the same class-
room. The popular term for this concept, "mainstreaming,"
came into wide use at about this time.19
Parents of handicapped children provided additional impe-
tus for the enactment of the EAHCA. Parents organized
themselves and questioned the need for segregation, as well as
methods then used for evaluating and placing children. Par-
ents also sought more funding for meeting the educational
needs of their children.2°
Pursuing their efforts in the courts, parents and organiza-
tions supporting them were successful in two 1972 class actions
involving placement and educational services for handicapped
children. The first of these cases, Pennsylvania Association
for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth21 (P.A.R.C.), was
brought on behalf of mentally retarded children excluded from
education or training in Pennsylvania public schools. Approv-
ing a consent decree in P.A.R.C., the court required Penn-
sylvania to provide members of the class with a free public
education appropriate to individual learning capacity.22 The
court's consent decree also required the state to provide each
19. D. MooREs, EDUCATING THE DEAF. PSYCHOLGY, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES
14 (3d ed. 1987). At the time, the mainstreaming of handicapped children was
sometimes seen as an end rather than a means. See also Ramsey, supra note 4.
20. Hill, supra note 2, at 132-3.
21. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
22. Id. at 302.
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child with a written educational strategy and to review that
strategy annually. Furthermore, the state agreed to provide
parents with notice and an opportunity to be heard before
causing any change in a child's educational status.23
The second case, Mills v. Board of Education,24 involved a
much broader class. In Mills, seven children sued the District
of Columbia Board of Education on behalf of all mentally,
emotionally, or physically handicapped children excluded from
publicly supported education.25 Relying on Brown v. Board of
Education,26 the Mills court held that the District of Colum-
bia's treatment of handicapped children violated the due pro-
cess clause.27 In addition, both P.A.R.C and Mills established a
preference for educating handicapped children in mainstream
settings whenever possible.28
A number of right-to-education cases followed the P.A.R.C
and Mills decisions.' School officials responded to these cases
by joining the lobbying efforts of parents and special education
experts.30 Partly as a result of such efforts, Congress passed
the EAHCA in 1975.
As enacted, the EAHCA is broad in scope. In varying
degrees, it attempts to meet the interests of all those who lob-
bied for its passage.3' The Act provides financial assistance to
any state that "has in effect a policy that assures all handi-
capped children the right to a free appropriate public
education."'32
23. Id. at 303.
24. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
25. Id. at 868-70.
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Brown required
racial integration of public schools.
27. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
Not only are plaintiffs and their class denied the publicly supported education
to which they are entitled many [sic] are suspended or expelled from regular
schooling or specialized instruction or reassigned without any prior hearing
and are given no periodic review thereafter. Due process of law requires a
hearing prior to exclusion, termination of [sic] classification into a special
program. (Citations omitted).
Id.
28. P.A.R.C, 343 F. Supp. at 307; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 878.
29. See Hill, supra note 2, at 134 n. 28.
30. At this point, school officials began to realize the coming need for increased
funding. Id.
31. Id. at 134-36.
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1982). "[H]andicapped child means mentally retarded,
hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visually handicapped, seriously
emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other .health impaired children, or
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At the time of the Act's passage, there were approximately
eight million handicapped children in the United States; Con-
gress found that as many as half of these children were "not
receiv[ing] appropriate educational benefits which would
enable them to have full equality of opportunity.""3  In
response to concerns about lack of opportunity, the EAHCA
mandated that, to the maximum extent possible, handicapped
children should be educated with children who are not
handicapped.'
2. How the Act Works
In order to identify children who are in need of special
education and related services, schools often rely in the first
instance on referrals from parents and teachers.' A multidis-
ciplinary team, including at least one specialist in the area of
the child's disability, then conducts an evaluation to determine
the child's needs. Following this evaluation, the multidiscipli-
nary team recommends an appropriate placement.'
Before a student can be placed, however, school authori-
ties, in consultation with parents, must develop an individual-
ized education program (IEP) for that student.37 In terms of
implementation, the IEP is the cornerstone of the EAHCA.
It recognizes the individualized needs of a specific handicapped
child; however, because of its central role in identifying and
implementing the educational needs of handicapped children,
the IEP has become the primary area of conflict between
schools and parents.3 9 A parent dissatisfied with the decision
children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof require special
education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(b)(3).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b).
35. Hill, supra note 2, at 138.
36. 34 C.F.R. § 300.532. However, no single procedure is to be used to determine a
child's placement. § 300.532(d).
37. "The term 'individualized education program' means a written statement for
each handicapped child developed in any meeting by a representative of the local
educational agency or an intermediate educational unit..., the teacher, the parents or
guardian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child .... 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(19)(1982).
38. The IEP is to include a statement of the child's current educational
performance, annual goals, specific educational services to be provided, the extent to
which the child can participate in regular educational programs, dates for initiation
and completion, and provisions for annual evaluation. Id; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.340-
.349.
39. Hill, supra note 2, at 143.
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of school officials may seek administrative review by an educa-
tional agency,' and appeal the agency's decision for de novo
review in an action in state or federal court.4' The first such
action to reach the Supreme Court was Board of Education v.
Rowley.'
3. Board of Education v. Rowley
Amy Rowley was an intelligent eight year old with mini-
mal residual hearing and an ability to lip read. With an FM
hearing aid, Amy completed kindergarten. 3 Nevertheless,
without the assistance of a sign language interpreter, Amy was
able to comprehend less than half of what was said in the
classroom." Amy's parents sought the services of a classroom
interpreter through the IEP process. School officials disap-
proved of the use of an interpreter for Amy. Upholding the
decision of the school officials, the hearing examiner also ruled
against the parents. The hearing examiner's decision was, in
turn, upheld by the New York Commissioner of Education.45
On appeal to the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, the court affirmed the decision of the New
York Commissioner of Education and found that the disparity
between Amy's achievement and her potential meant that she
was not receiving a "free appropriate public education."' This
opinion was later reversed by the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. 47
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed.
The Court held that, as long as personalized instruction was
provided along with sufficient support services to permit the
child to benefit from the instruction, the child was receiving a
"free appropriate public education" within the meaning con-
templated by the Act.48 Besides interpreting the concept of
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c).
41. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2).
42. 458 U.S. 176.
43. Id. at 184.
44. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 184-85.
46. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson School Dist., 483 F. Supp. 528,
534 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), quoted in 458 U.S. at 185.
47. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson School Dist., 632 F.2d 945 (2nd
Cir. 1980).
48. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189. In determining whether a child is
receiving a benefit, courts could consider, as one factor, whether a child was awarded
passing marks and progressed from grade to grade. Id. at 204, 207 n.28. For an
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"free appropriate public education," Rowley established a two-
part test for examining the procedural safeguards embodied in
the EAHCA. The test asks, first, whether the state has com-
plied with the procedures set forth in the Act,4 9 and second,
whether the individualized education program developed
through the Act's procedures is reasonably calculated to enable
the child to receive educational benefits. If these requirements
are met, the state has complied with the obligations imposed
by Congress and the courts can require no more.50
Thus, the focus of the inquiry was shifted from defining
what is "appropriate" to what is "a benefit" or what is "mean-
ingful."'5 ' Because each of these terms is ambiguous, courts
continue to grapple with these issues in attempting to mete out
justice under the EAHCA.5 2  At the same time, the Court
noted that the procedural safeguards in the Act "cannot be
gainsaid."53 Compliance with the established procedures, the
Court went on to say, will assure most if not all of what Con-
gress wished in the way of substantive content in an IEP.5
However, the Court admonished reviewing courts from impos-
ing their preferences for educational methodology on state
authorities, noting that such courts lack the expertise neces-
sary to resolve such issues.'5 Finally, although the Rowley
court did not directly address the issue of mainstreaming, it
noted that the Act established a preference for mainstreaming
by requiring that handicapped children be educated with non-
handicapped children whenever possible.56
examination of the effectiveness of "educational benefit" as a standard see Broadwell,
supra note 18, and Note, Attack on the EHA, supra note 18.
49. The state must have adopted the policies and procedures required by the Act
and must have created an IEP that conforms with 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19). Board of Educ.
v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206 n.27.
50. Id. at 206-07.
51. Id. at 192, dissent at 214. See also Broadwell, supra note 18, at 36 (quoting
Tucker, Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley:
Utter Chaos, 12 J.L. & EaUC. 235, 241 (1983)) and Hill, supra note 2, at 159-60, n. 145.
52. See, e.g., Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988); Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
Roncker ex rel. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S.
864 (1983).
53. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205.
54. Id. at 206.
55. Id. at 207-08. See also infra notes 138-146 and accompanying text.
56. Id. at 202.
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B. What Is a "Free Appropriate Public Education" Under
the Act?
In order to meet the definition of "free appropriate public
education" under the Act, programs must emphasize special
education and related services designed to meet unique needs:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special
education57 and related services 58 which (A) have been pro-
vided at public expense, under public supervision and direc-
tion, and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State
involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the
[IEP] .... 59
In Rowley, the Supreme Court equated "free appropriate
public education" with an IEP that would allow a child to
receive educational benefit.' In practice, however, "appropri-
ate" is often determined by placement rather than by educa-
tional and related services designed to meet an individual
child's needs, as required by the Act."' Educators often assume
that whatever services they have available for deaf students
will be sufficient to meet an individual deaf child's needs and
then incorporate such services into the plan. 2 This focus on
available services may influence educators to place substantial
emphasis on the other major concept embodied in the Act,
least restrictive environment.
C. What Is the "Least Restrictive Environment"?
The Commission on Education of the Deaf identified the
question of what constitutes an "appropriate" education in the
least restrictive environment as the most explosive and prob-
57. "Special education" means "specially designed instruction, at no cost to
parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a handicapped child .... " 20 U.S.C."
§ 1401(16).
58. Related services include transportation and developmental, corrective and
other supportive services as required to allow a child to benefit from special education.
Id. § 1401(17). Whether related services include sign language interpretation remains a
matter for debate. See Broadwell, supra note 18, at 46-48.
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (18).
60. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189, 207. See supra notes 43 to 48 and
accompanying text; also see generally Hill, supra note 2.
61. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(4)(B)(i). See generally, Hill, supra note 2, and DuBow,
Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7.
62. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 20.
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lematic issue encountered in its study.63 Mainstreaming is a
laudable goal of the EAHCA. Neither students nor society will
benefit by returning to the days of segregating handicapped
students merely to keep them separate from non-handicapped
students. However, mainstream placements fail to meet the
educational needs of at least some handicapped children.
There is no reason to establish a goal of mainstreaming as an
end in itself."
The Act itself speaks rather obliquely to the issue of main-
streaming when it requires states to establish procedures
assuring that, "to the maximum extent appropriate, handi-
capped children . . .are educated with children who are not
handicapped."'  Further, the Act provides that "special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of handicapped
children from the regular educational environment [should]
occur only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such
that education in regular classes . . cannot be achieved
satisfactorily...."'
The U.S. Department of Education's Office of Special Edu-
cation has incorporated this language in the regulations imple-
menting the EAHCA 7  The regulations require that a
continuum of alternative placements be available to meet edu-
cational needs, including regular classes, special classes, and
special schools.'3 Beyond these regulations, determining the
LRE is a placement decision made in the context of the IEP
developed for each child.69 The LRE is widely interpreted to
mean "mainstreaming," or the integration of handicapped stu-
dents into a regular setting.70 Moreover, the underlying pur-
pose of mainstreaming is to enable such students to better cope
with the world at large, as well as to expose "normal" students
to individual differences.7 '
63. Id. at 25.
64. See Hill, supra note 2; COMMIsSION, supra note 8, at 25-26; and DuBow,
Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7. For a justification of mainstreaming on social,
educational, and, especially, moral grounds, see P. HIGGINS, THE CHALLENGE OF
EDUCATING TOGETHER DEAF AND HEARING YOUTH: MAKING MAINSTREAMING WORK
52-53 (1990) [hereinafter HIGGINS, MAKING MAINSTREAMING WORK].
65. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5).
66. Id.
67. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b).
68. § 300.551.
69. COMMISSION, supra note 8 at 25-6.
70. See DuBow, Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7.
71. Hill, supra note 2, at 140. See also Ramsey, supra note 4, at 14. Mainstreaming
has also been supported because the educational process for handicapped children is
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D. The Tension Between "Free Appropriate Public
Education" and Least Restrictive Environment
One of the primary obstacles to achieving an appropriate
public education for deaf children stems from the inherent
conflict between an "appropriate" education and the main-
streaming principle of least restrictive environment. In addi-
tion, application of the LRE requirement is fraught with
difficulty. Noting that it had received more input on this issue
than any other, the Commission reported:
Parents, deaf consumers, and professional personnel of all
persuasions have, with almost total unanimity, cited LRE as
the issue that most thwarts their attempts to provide an
appropriate education for children who are deaf. They
reported that many placement decisions were made with no
regard for the potentially harmful effects on the child or the
quality of education to be provided. As a consequence, these
decisions were so detrimental that the resulting education
was not appropriate to the child's needs.72
In fact, in determining the LRE, school administrators are
required to take into account potentially harmful effects on
the child. 3 In addition, though the Rowley Court also recog-
nized the Act's preference for mainstreaming,74 this preference
is not a mandate.
The Commission finds that undue emphasis on LRE by
the U.S. Department of Education, given the low incidence and
unique ramifications of deafness, has resulted in a lack of
appropriate education for deaf children.75 The Commission
sees the LRE as a placement issue, secondary to appropriate-
ness.76 In contrast, the Department of Education has identified
LRE as a "core value" of the Act.77 Citing the benefits of
mainstreaming, the Department's Office of Special Education
noted in a 1988 Policy Letter purporting to explain the LRE
requirement:
seen at least in part as a socialization process for which "normal" models are needed.
Id.; see also supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
72. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 25; see also supra note 10.
73. 34 C.F.R. § 300.552(d). The comment to this section notes that placement
decisions must be made on an individual basis.
74. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03.
75. COMMISSION, Supra note 8, at 20.
76. Id. at 26.
77. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550-556. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 26. See also DuBow,
Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7, at 216.
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Our experience is that both students with disabilities and
their non handicapped peers benefit from. integrated educa-
tion. Only through frequent and prolonged contact with stu-
dents with disabilities can nondisabled children begin to
focus on the individual strengths, determination, and inde-
pendence exhibited by individuals with disabilities. Inte-
grated education and community-based programming
establishes the expectation that individuals with disabilities
are an important and typical part of community and neigh-
borhood activities.7"
Thus, the Department of Education's explanation for the LRE
policy appears to value generalized benefits to society over
educational benefits to individual handicapped children. It is
difficult to see how such a policy serves the avowed congres-
sional purpose of the EAHCA to provide a free appropriate
public education for handicapped children.7 9
In practice, a wide and somewhat disturbing range of fac-
tors and characteristics can affect placement decisions for indi-
vidual deaf students. Three of these factors- academic skills,
communication skills, and perceived level of social develop-
ment-are skills that mainstreaming is ironically supposed to
foster. The others include ethnicity and less tangible personal
characteristics such as "above average intelligence" or an
" 'outgoing' or 'aggressive' personality."'  Perhaps the most
disquieting factor considered in making placement decisions,
however, is the level of the classroom teacher's willingness to
accept a deaf student."' In part, the IEP provides a mechanism
for dealing with this divergent range of factors and
characteristics.
E. The Role of the Individualized Education Program
Congress recognized the Individualized Educational Pro-
gram8 2 as a significant component in achieving an appropriate
education for a handicapped child under the Act. 3 The Act
mandates that the IEP include the following information:
1) the child's present levels of educational performance;
78. EHA Rulings/Policy Letters, EHLR 213:216 (1989) (emphasis added).
79. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
80. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 28-29 (quoting R. BRILL, MAINSTREAMING THE
PRELINGUALLY DEAF CHILD (1978)).
81. Id. at 29-30.
82. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
83. 1975 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 1425, 1434-8.
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2) annual goals, including short-term instructional
objectives;
3) specific educational services to be provided;
4) the extent to which the child can participated in regular
educational programs;
5) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration
of such services;
6) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation procedures
for use on at least an annual basis."
Beyond its content, the IEP is intended to provide a vehi-
cle for parental participation.' Theoretically, parents are on
an equal footing with school administrators in the IEP devel-
opment process.8s In actuality, this is very seldom the case.
First, unlike school administrators who may view the IEP pro-
cess as bureaucratic routine, parents see their children as indi-
viduals with unique needs, talents and problems.8 7 Parents are
arguably best suited to customizing the IEP, so that it does not
become a fill-in-the-blanks format for the convenience of
school officials." Second, no required or uniform mechanism
exists to resolve disputes short of administrative review and
adjudication. 9
The Commission on Education of the Deaf has apparently
determined that the IEP, as a vehicle for achieving appropriate
education, does not have content requirements sufficiently
geared to the needs of deaf children.' The Commission has
recommended to Congress that, because many educational per-
sonnel are unaware of the needs of deaf children, additional
criteria be added to IEP's in the case of deaf students.9 '
84. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(19).
85. 34 C.F.R. § § 300.344, 345.
86. Hill, supra note 2, at 139-40. "The IEP meeting serves as a communication
vehicle between parents and school personnel, and enables them, as equal
participants, to jointly decide what the child's needs are, what services will be
provided to meet those needs, and what the anticipated outcomes may be." 34 C.F.R.
§ 300 app. C(I)(a)(1986) (quoted in id. at 140 n.60).
87. Hill, supra note 2, at 148.
88. Id.
89. Hill points out that, in general, school officials seldom find themselves in a
cooperative posture with parents in determining educational needs. One result is an
increased number of IEPs, which become the focus of adversity. Id. at 140.
90. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 20-21. The Commission has recommended the
inclusion of ten additional criteria, indicating that existing criteria are not adequate.
The Commission also noted that it "regards this recommendation as our most
important." Id.
91. Id. at 20. The recommended criteria for inclusion in a deaf child's IEP are:
1) communicative needs and the preferred mode of communication
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In Briggs v. Board of Education, a recent Second Circuit
opinion involving the education of a deaf child under the
EAHCA, the parties' positions fully exposed the conflict
between the development and implementation of an IEP.92 In
that case, the child's parents interestingly argued for a main-
stream placement, while the school district proposed an IEP
that would allow mainstreaming only after the child had
acquired an additional language base.93 The positions of the
parties in Briggs are in a sense unexpected: The school resists
mainstreaming; the parents resist segregation with personal-
ized instruction. 4  Perhaps for that very reason the case
affords a useful backdrop for exploring the issues surrounding
the role of parents in determining the type of education their
deaf child will receive under the Act.95 These issues become
clear, however, only after a description of the Act's effect on
deaf students.
III. THE EAHCA's UNIQUE IMPACTS ON DEAF CHILDREN
The Act's effects on deaf students fall into two broad cate-
gories. First, because the incidence of deaf children among the
population of handicapped students is relatively small," deaf
students are unlikely to do well in competition for scarce pub-
lic resources.97 Second, deaf students are isolated by their disa-
2) linguistic needs
3) severity of hearing loss and the potential for using residual hearing





9) cultural needs, and
10) family support
Id. at 20-21. The Commission notes that "[tihis list should not be considered an
exhaustive summary of all relevant factors which warrant examination; neither does
the order in which these factors are listed reflect the relative importance of each com-
ponent. These factors are often interrelated." Id. at 48 n.24.
92. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of Connecticut, 882 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 690.
94. These positions are somewhat unexpected because schools often favor
mainstream placements because they are more cost effective.
95. See infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text.
96. See inkfra note 100, 101 and accompanying text.
97. At least one court has recognized that cost is a legitimate factor that schools
can weigh in making placement decisions. A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813
F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987). However, another court held
that a school district cannot plead cost if the district has failed to provide "a proper
continuum of alternative placements," Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.
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bility in a way unlike any other disabled population.
Communication is part and parcel of education, and, histori-
cally, the deaf were considered uneducable."8 However, while
we may now be more enlightened as a nation, we have still
failed to recognize the unique needs of the deaf in gaining
access to a meaningful education.
A. Limited Resources and Small Populations
An annual survey conducted by the Gallaudet Research
Institute" reported 36,017 deaf students in 1986-87.100 In spite
of a 22 percent decrease in school-age deaf students from 1978
to 1986, placement of the deaf in public school settings
increased 16 percent.' 0 ' During this period, local mainstream
programs for deaf students doubled. Although in the abstract
mainstream programs may provide less costly placements for
more students, one half of these programs served only one stu-
dent, and an additional 16 percent of the programs served only
two. 02
As a result of these changes in the school placements of
deaf students, funding for public residential deaf schools has
been decreased. At the same time, school districts have
required additional support for their programs. And, while the
number of deaf children in public schools has increased over-
all, any one school is likely to have only a small number of
deaf students. Public schools often find it more economical to
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). See DuBow, Turbulent Mainstream, supra note
7, at 225.
The Act provides financial assistance to the states based on compliance with the
Act's procedural requirements. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
98. 0. SACKS, SEEING VOICES: A JOURNEY INTO THE WORLD OF THE DEAF 9 (1989)
[hereinafter SACKS]. For a history of educating handicapped children in the United
States, see Comment, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act Trends and
Problems with the "Related Services" Provision, 18 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 427, 429-
432 (1988).
99. The Gallaudet Research Institute is a division of Gallaudet University in
Washington, D.C. Sometimes referred to as the national university for the deaf,
Gallaudet offers undergraduate degrees in 26 major fields and graduate degrees in
audiology, education, counseling, linguistics and administration of special programs.
The institute is a center for research on hearing impairment and related subjects. See
1 GALLAUDET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS 447-454 (J. Van Cleve
ed., 1987).
100. Quoted in COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 10.
101. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 9-10; Schildroth, Recent Changes in the
Educational Placement of Deaf Students, 33 AMERICAN ANNALS OF THE DEAF 61, 62
(1988).
102. C. Ramsey, Dissertation Proposal at 6 (1989) (on file with the author).
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adapt their existing resources, for example, by training
existing staff to meet their increased needs rather than hiring
additional, specialized staff.103
Hearing-impaired children who receive special education
are placed in a variety of public and private settings such as
day classes, day schools, and residential schools. About 60 per-
cent are in public day classes; over 40 percent are main-
streamed to some degree. Children in mainstream settings are
more likely to be from white, middle-class families with hear-
ing parents, to have less severe hearing losses, and to have
more understandable speech capabilities than those placed in
other settings.1°4
Urban centers can provide the alternative of private day
schools for deaf students only, or public magnet schools with
special programs for deaf students only.105 Day schools for the
deaf have existed in the United States since the 19th century.
The number of day schools dramatically increased during the
seventies because of the increased population of deaf students
caused by the 1963-65 rubella epidemic. However, an overall
decline in birth rate coincided with the passing of the "rubella
bulge," and the number of day schools once again declined."°
Special programs in public schools for deaf students only allow
school districts to economically provide specialized services
that may be missing in neighborhood schools. However, chil-
dren who are placed in these special programs may spend a sig-
nificant amount of time travelling to and from school.1 °7 The
low incidence of deafness, coupled with limited resources,
requires schools and towns to collaborate in creating programs
for deaf students. Few school districts are able to offer every
possible option, not only because of restricted funds but
because of the administrative problems of developing adequate
staff and curricula. 08
103. C. PADDEN & T. HumPHRi-_.s, DEAF IN AMERICA 115-16 (1988); see also
HIGGINS, MAKING MAINSTREAMING WORK, supra note 64, at 52-53.
104. P. HIGGINS & J. NASH, UNDERSTANDING DEAFNESS SOCIALLY 125-26 (1987)
[hereinafter HIGGINS & NASH].
105. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 395,
398.
106. Id. at 395. See DuBow, Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7 at 218-21 for a
more detailed discussion of alternative placement settings.
107. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 350-51.
The extent to which additional travel time is a disadvantage will not be the same in
every case, but rather depend upon an individual child's circumstances.
108. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 379.
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Compared to day programs or day schools, residential
schools have played a unique role in the education of the deaf.
A number of writers, deaf educators, and the deaf themselves
recognize residential schools as vehicles for socialization and
cultural identity in addition to education." 9 Forty-seven states,
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have at least one
residential school for the deaf."0 There are over 70 public resi-
dential schools and nine private residential schools for the deaf
in the United States. Overall, about 65 percent of the pupils
reside at such schools, and the remaining students are day
students."'
In addition, the unique role that residential schools play in
the education of the deaf stems partly from the schools'
diverse composition of students, equality of instruction, and
wide range of benefits available. Beginning in the 1970s, resi-
dential schools have increasingly served older students. In
contrast to students who are mainstreamed, residential stu-
dents are more likely to be members of minority groups or to
have multiple handicaps and are more likely to be taught by a
hearing-impaired adult. 1 2 Larger student populations allow
residential schools to achieve certain benefits for their stu-
dents. For example, students who are alike in their impair-
ments can be grouped together more easily; the school can
provide more specialized equipment, as well as staff specialists
such as psychologists and guidance counselors; deaf teachers
are available as role models for students; students can partici-
pate in extracurricular activities and athletics led by staff who
can communicate with them.13
Even though residential schools tend to serve different
segments of the deaf population, they must often compete for
funding with other publicly-funded programs." 4 Thus, to some
extent, the public policy preference for mainstreaming many
deaf students has threatened the quality of educational oppor-
109. See generally, SACKS, supra note 98; PADDEN, supra note 103; and J. VAN
CLEVE AND B. CROUCH, A PLACE OF THEIR OWN: CREATING THE DEAR COMMUNITY IN
AMERICA 171 (1989) [hereinafter CROUCH].
110. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 397.
Rhode Island can effectively use day schools because of its size, while New Hampshire
has some day schools, but also pays tuition for its students attending out-of-state
residential schools. Nevada has a day school program in Las Vegas.
111. Id. at 396.
112. HIGGINS & NASH, supra note 104, at 125.
113. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 396-97.
114. PADDEN, supra note 103, at 115.
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tunities for others." 5 Though the competition for resources
will continue, placement determinations based on individual
need will derive better results than determinations based upon
a generalized preference for one type of placement. In addi-
tion to individual need, however, placement decisions must
also take into account the range and methods available for
teaching and communicating with deaf children.
B. Implications of Educating the Deaf
1. Introduction
Deafness occurs in varying degrees, and it is not only "the
degree of deafness that matters but-crucially-the age, or
stage at which it occurs.""'  Those who become deaf before
language is acquired, the prelingually deaf, "are in a category
qualitatively different from all others. For these people, who
have never heard, who have no possible auditory memories,
images, or associations, there can never be even the illusion of
sound. ' '"1 7
Ninety-five percent of deaf children are either congeni-
tally deaf or prelingually deaf,"8 and many enter school with-
out a competent language base."19  For such students,
placement in a local public school may equal a more, not less,
restrictive environment. Indeed, a child who is limited in the
number of people with whom she can interact is highly
restricted in an environment that fails to meet her particular
linguistic, cultural, and educational needs."2
A major obstacle such a child faces is isolation. One com-
mentator has argued that "[I]solation from one's own linguistic
115. CROUCH, supra note 109, at 171.
116. SACKS, supra note 98, at 5.
The term "deaf" is vague, or rather is so general that it impedes
consideration of the vastly differing degrees of deafness, degrees that are of
qualitative, and even of "existential" significance. There are the "hard of
hearing," ... who can manage to hear some speech using hearing aids ....
There are also the "severely deaf," many as a result of ear disease or
injury in early life; but with them, as with the hard of hearing, the hearing of
speech is still possible....
Then there are the "profoundly deaf" ... who have no hope at all of
hearing any speech .... Profoundly deaf people cannot converse in the usual
way-they must either lip-read... or use sign language, or both.
Id. at 4-5.
117. Id. at 7.
118. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 15.
119. Id. at 16.
120. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 21-22.
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and intellectual potential is much more serious than physical
isolation from able bodied peers."12' Such isolation has also
troubled the Commission on Education of the Deaf, which con-
siders isolation a barrier to the acquisition of language. 2 2 Sig-
nificantly, the Commission considers the acquisition of English
language as a primary goal of deaf education,12  and beyond
this, recognizes the existence and importance of a distinct deaf
culture.24
2. Means of Communication
Residential schools have served as the vehicle for the
transmission of deaf culture and have enhanced the develop-
ment of a self-identified deaf community.' The means of
communication in residential schools is unique to the deaf-a
manual language called American Sign Language (ASL).'" It
is important to note that ASL is not a version of English, but
an independent language. ASL has thus played pivotal dual
roles in the development of deaf community and culture:
ASL has a unifying function, since deaf people are unified by
their common language. But the use of ASL simultaneously
separates deaf people from the hearing world. So the two
functions are different perspectives on the same reality--one
from inside the group which is unified, and the other from
outside.127
121. Ramsey, supra note 4, at 22.
122. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 16.
123. Id. at 19.
The Congress and the Department of Education should ensure that
facilitating English language acquisition in students who are deaf (including
vocal, visual, and written language) is a paramount concern.... Language
acquisition should be a top priority in federally funded research. Id.
124. Id. at xv. See generally SACKS, supra note 98, and PADDEN, supra note 103.
125. MOORES, supra note 19 at 27; 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND
DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at 261; DuBow, Turbulent Mainstream, supra note 7, at 219.
The deaf world, like all subcultures, is formed partly by exclusion (from the
hearing world) and partly by the formation of a community and a world
around a different center-its own center. To the extent that the deaf feel
excluded, they may feel isolated, set apart, discriminated against. To the
extent that they form a deaf world, voluntarily, for themselves, they are at
home in it . . . . In this aspect the deaf world feels self-sufficient, not
isolated-it has no wish to assimilate or be assimilated; on the contrary, it
cherishes its own language and images, and wishes to protect them.
SACKS, supra note 98, at 128.
126. MOORES, supra note 19, at 27. ASL is neither a coded version of English or a
collection of gestures, but a fully developed and distinct language. See generally
MOORES; SACKS, supra note 98; and PADDEN, supra note 103.
127. SACKS, supra note 98, at 130 (quoting B. Kannapell, Personal Awareness and
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In spite of its role in the culture and community of the
deaf, however, ASL is not the only method by which the deaf
communicate and, surprisingly, is seldom the method by which
deaf children are taught.2 ' As the deaf school-age population
has increased in local schools and decreased in residential
schools, deaf children are educated using a variety of communi-
cation methodologies.'- 9 Indeed, oral and manual education
methods have been the subject of a controversy literally centu-
ries old.130  Although a thorough discussion of the different
education methods is beyond the scope of this Comment, a
brief description will help to clarify the application of the
EAHCA to deaf students.
3. Methods of Instruction
In his pre-Rowley article exploring potential impacts of
EAHCA on the deaf, Donald Large identified four philosophies
underlying the methods used to educate deaf children: manual
instruction, oral and aural instruction, total communication,
and cued speech.' 31
Manual instruction comprises both the use of signs (one
hand signal for an entire word or concept) and finger-spell-
Advocacy in the Deaf Community, SIGN LANGUAGE AND THE DEAF COMMUNITY
(1980)). ASL is often identified as a primary unifying feature of the deaf community.
PADDEN, supra note 103, at 7-9; MOORES, supra note 19, at 180.
128. MOORES, supra note 19, at 13.
Likewise, the self-identified deaf community which uses ASL does not encompass
the entire deaf population of the United States. Some argue that the use of sign
language or separate educational, recreational, and other facilities tends to isolate deaf
people from society. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEAF PEOPLE AND DEAFNESS, supra note 99, at
261. One organization supporting this view is the Alexander Graham Bell Association
for the Deaf, which exists to promote the use of speech, speech reading, and residual
hearing by hearing impaired persons. Id. at 12-13.
129. MOORES, supra note 19, at 10-11.
Because these methodologies determine how students and teachers communicate,
one group of authors argues that they are more properly viewed as educational
policies. R. JOHNSON, S. LIDDELL & C. ERTING, UNLOCKING THE CURRICULUM:
PRINCIPLES FOR ACHIEVING ACCESS IN DEAF EDUCATION 2, (Gallaudet Research
Institute Working Paper 89-3, 1989) [hereinafter JOHNSON].
130. Large, Special Problems of the Deaf Under the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 213, 229 (1980); MOOES, supra
note 19, at 218. Moores finds the "oral/manual" controversy technically incorrect;
rather, the controversy is whether oral-alone methods should be used for all children.
The alternative is "total communication," a combination of oral methods plus signing
or finger-spelling.
The variations on methodology are extensive and complex. For more complete
treatment, see Large at 229-238; and MOORES, supra note 19, at 10-13 and 181-218.
131. Large, supra note 130, at 229.
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ing (spelling a word letter by letter with a different signal
for each letter). The absence of attempted oral expression is
the significant feature of manual education. Head move-
ments and facial expressions are a part of every method of
manual education.132
A school program using a manual approach would permit
the use of sign in the classroom-Signed English, Signing
Exact English (SEE 1), Seeing Essential English (SEE 2), or,
more rarely, ASL. All approaches, except for SEE 2, include
some elements of finger-spelling. 133
Conversely, oral methods completely exclude sign lan-
guage and rely on utilizing residual hearing to foster language
and speech skills. This method also has a number of variants.
Auralism, for example, discourages any reliance on lip reading
in the classroom. 134
A third method, total communication, is one of the most
frequently used in the education of the deaf. This method
combines the oral method with signs and finger-spelling. It
also has practical appeal for school districts because it appears
to offer something for everyone at the cost of only one pro-
gram.135 Whether the method is effective, however, remains to
be proven.136
Finally, cued speech, which was developed at Gallaudet in
1965, is a modified oral program designed to meet the objection
that too many words look alike when lip-read. Cued speech
uses first-letter signals with speech to help distinguish sounds
that look alike. 37
132. Id.
133. Id. at 229-32.
134. Id. at 232-33.
135. Id. at 235-37.
A public school district, with limited resources, usually can afford to
provide only one program for its deaf children. Because it has many other
handicapping conditions to treat, it is generally impracticable to satisfy one
small segment of the community. An attempt to establish a purely manual
program usually sparks opposition from parents who want their children to
have at least some oral exposure. On the other hand, an attempt to have only
an oral program may cause opposition from parents or deaf children who
cannot succeed in a strictly oral environment.
Id. at 237.
Total communication also refers to a philosophy that "endorses the right of every
hearing-impaired child to communicate by whatever means are to be found beneficial."
MOORES, supra note 19, at 11.
136. JOHNSON, supra note 129, at 2.
137. Large, supra note 130, at 237-38. Proponents of all other methods criticize
cued speech. Oralists object to the use of hand signals, auralists to the emphasis on lip
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Each of these methods has, in one fashion or another, had
substantial impact on the education of the deaf. Recent studies
show that, while methods combining sign and speech prevail in
both special and local schools, about 30 percent of integrated
students in local schools are taught using auditory/oral
methods.' 3
Conflicts between educators and parents of deaf children
tend to center on the type of English deaf children will use and
how to foster its development.'" While practical considera-
tions such as resource limitations impact school district deci-sions, 14 parents are more likely to be motivated by norms and
values, such as how they want their children to be socialized. 141
Nevertheless, the Commission on Education of the Deaf found
that "little weight is given to the value of using the method of
communication the child has been accustomed to as part of his
or her total program,"'" and has proposed that the child's pre-
ferred method of communication be included in the IEP. That
method may be preferable because it is one to which the child
is most accustomed, or because it is one the parents select and
support. 1 43
However, no one method is likely to be appropriate for all
hearing impaired children. For example, the deaf child of deaf
parents may already communicate well in ASL. Her parents
may also view an oral program or even a total communication
program that utilizes a manual language other than ASL as
completely inappropriate. They may feel that she is being
offered an education in an alien culture. 144
reading. Those who favor total communication find that cued speech fails to deal with
the child's understanding of what is communicated. Finally, proponents of manual
systems see cued speech as "slightly modified oralism, and... thus incompatible with
any of the major signing systems." Id.
138. Schildroth, supra note 101, at 64.
139. C. Ramsey, Signing Exact English: The Meaning of English in Deaf
Education 2 (January, 1989) (unpublished manuscript).
140. Large, supra note 130, at 237.
141. Id. at 237 n.83.
Unlike deaf adults, who tend to prefer manual education or total
communication, hearing parents of deaf children usually prefer to start their
children in oral programs. This may be because . . . they are unable to
appreciate deafness and unwilling to admit that their children are deaf; or
because ... they are more aware of the importance of speech in society and
realize that oral programs produce more children who can join that society.
Id.
142. COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 9.
143. Id. at 20-21.
144. Another type of problem may arise when a school must make an appropriate
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From a practical standpoint, however, a school district will
likely find it impossible to offer two programs for two deaf stu-
dents. Thus, the potential arises for dissension between par-
ents and schools. As previously noted, the Rowley decision
defers to educators as experts on methodology. 45 However, to
the extent that school districts can use methodology to manip-
ulate students' needs to fit within the school's resources, the
EAHCA's promise of an appropriate education for each handi-
capped child will remain a hollow victory. The courts can
ensure that schools fulfill this promise by enforcing the Act's
requirement that schools use EAHCA funding to provide an
appropriate education for each child based on that child's indi-
vidual need. This requires the courts to independently assess
the IEP under the EAHCA to ensure its adequacy in light of
the Act's procedural requirements. 146
IV. A RECENT DECISION UNDER THE EAHCA: BRIGGS V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
The 1982 decision of Board of Education v. Rowley
requires courts to defer to school authorities on matters of edu-
cational theory or policy, including methods of instruction. 47
On the other hand, the Act and its implementing regulations
recognize parents as equal participants in developing a child's
IEP.14  Thus, while this recognition affords parents procedural
safeguards in the event of a dispute over an IEP's components,
parents are no longer on an equal footing with school officials
if they chose to appeal an administrative decision.149
placement for a hearing-impaired child with additional disabilities, such as blindness,
developmental disability or severe behavior problems.
145. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-08.
146. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
147. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08. As a practical matter, the expertise of school
administrators in educating the handicapped is a matter of some debate. For example,
the Commission on the Education of the Deaf, asserts that "[tlhe low incidence of
deafness coupled with its unique ramifications means the needs of children who are
deaf are easily and frequently neglected.... [Miany educational personnel are simply
unaware of the unique needs of children who are deaf, and thus fail to identify and
meet these needs." COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 20.
148. 34 C.F.R. § § 300.344, .345. See supra notes 84-89.
149. For an analysis of the burdens facing parents in such disputes, see Hill, supra
note 2 and Guernsey, supra note 16. One court addressing standards for deference to
school administrators declined to adopt any formula, but required a challenging party
to "at least take on the burden of persuading the court that the hearing officer was
wrong . . . " and required a court overturning the hearing officer to explain its basis
for doing so. Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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While the Rowley decision requires deference to adminis-
trative decisions on methodology it certainly does not prohibit
courts from applying the requirements of the Act to the facts
of each individual case. Specifically, courts can and should
determine whether school officials have recognized the individ-
ual needs of a child.' 5°
A. Background of Briggs
Some recent court decisions under the EAHCA have
demonstrated a limited understanding of the educational needs
of deaf children.' 51 The decision in Briggs v. Board of Educa-
tion illustrates the issues that commonly arise when the par-
ents of a deaf child disagree with school authorities over an
IEP.
In May 1986 James Briggs, a three-year-old with moderate
to severe hearing loss and mild to moderate speech delays, was
evaluated by the Planning and Placement Team of the New
Haven, Connecticut school board. The team recommended
placement in a public preschool program for hearing-impaired
children. The program then included seven children and used
auditory trainers and materials to develop speech and language
for the hearing impaired.'52
James's parents, however, thought he should interact with
non-handicapped children and wanted him to be main-
streamed. Instead of following the team's recommendation,
they placed James in a private summer program, The Sound-
ings, which included about 20 students, most of whom were not
hearing-impaired. There, James received speech and language
therapy, and at the end of the summer he had improved in
speech and language abilities.' 53
At a second meeting, the placement team renewed its rec-
ommendation that James receive special education in New
Haven's segregated preschool program. The team justified its
decision on the basis of James's hearing impairment and
speech and language delays. James's IEP called for a less
restrictive placement "when the intelligibility of [James's]
speech and language no longer interfere with his communica-
150. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a).
151. See, e.g., Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1988);
Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of Connecticut, 882 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir. 1989).
152. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ. of Connecticut, 707 F. Supp. 623, 624-25 (D. Conn. 1988).
153. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 689-90; 707 F. Supp. at 624-25.
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tion" in a learning environment."M
The Briggses returned James to The Soundings and
requested an administrative review. According to the opinion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the hearing officer
received evidence comparing the two programs:
The Board's program was held in an elementary school in
New Haven. The program met five days a week, five hours a
day during the 180 day school year. The teacher in charge of
the pre-school program for the hearing-impaired held a Mas-
ters degree in education of the deaf and was a certified
teacher of the hearing-impaired. She was assisted by two
aids with experience working with hearing-impaired chil-
dren. Seven children were enrolled in the program. The
Board's program 'stress[ed] language and vocabulary concen-
tration.' Specialized equipment such as auditory trainers,
which are FM receivers that amplify the sound that is trans-
mitted by the teacher who wears a microphone, was used for
part of the day. Students typically spend one or two years in
the program and then are placed in non-specialized or main-
stream kindergarten programs.
The program at The Soundings met three days a week
for four hours a day. The director ... was a speech and lan-
guage pathologist with a background in psychology and
social work. She was not certified as a teacher of the hear-
ing-impaired. None of the staff members at The Soundings
had any special education training. Eighteen to twenty chil-
dren were enrolled in The Soundings.... [Two or three
besides James had speech and language problems.155
The hearing officer decided that the New Haven program
was appropriate and reasonably designed to meet James's edu-
cational needs." The hearing officer also determined that the
Briggses had failed to support their contention that James's
needs could only be met in "a social milieu of predominantly
non-handicapped children.' 1 57
The Briggses then appealed the hearing officer's decision
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut,
154. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 690. It is not evident from the record whether or when the
placement team predicted that a less restrictive placement would ever be appropriate
for James given this requirement. Neither does the record reflect whether the IEP set
out objective criteria for measuring the adequacy of James's communication abilities.
155. Id. at 690.
156. Id. at 690-92; Briggs, 707 F. Supp. at 625.
157. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 691. Surprisingly, neither the district court nor the court
of appeals included in its opinion any finding of James's educational needs.
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which, under the act, reviewed the appeal de novo. ls In its
review, the district court recognized the admonishment in
Rowley not to substitute its own educational policy preferences
for the decision of the school authorities.159 However, finding
that the Act provided substantive guidance on issues of main-
streaming, the court overturned the hearing officer's ruling." °
Thus, the court held that the second inquiry under Rowley-
whether the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to
receive educational benefits-"must be adjusted to account for
the strong congressional preference for mainstreaming.''96
The court proceeded to adopt a standard that, in cases where a
segregated facility was deemed superior, required a determina-
tion of
whether the services which make the placement superior
could feasibly be provided in a non-segregated setting. If
they can, the placement in the segregated school would be
inappropriate under the Act. Framing the issue in this man-
ner accords the proper respect for the strong preference in
favor of mainstreaming while still realizing the possibility
that some handicapped children simply must be educated in
segregated facilities .... 162
Under this standard, the court found the proper inquiry to
be "whether or not the services offered could feasibly be pro-
vided in a mainstream program."'6 At the same time, the
court recognized that services would not necessarily be identi-
cal in mainstream and segregated programs" and proceeded
to adopt a balancing test which weighed the benefits of a main-
stream program with those of a segregated setting.1" Applying
this balancing test, the district court found that the benefits
James would receive in a mainstream program would outweigh
158. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) provides that "the court shall receive the records of the
administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party,
and, basing its decision on a preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as
the court determines is appropriate."
159. Briggs, 707 F. Supp. at 625.
160. Id. at 627.
161. Id. at 626. The first inquiry under Rowley-whether the State complied with
the Act's procedural requirements---was not relevant because there was no procedural
dispute.
162. Id. at 626 (quoting Roncker on behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058,
1063 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)).
163. Id. (quoting Roncker at 1062-3).
164. Id. at 627.
165. Id. at 626.
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the effectiveness of a segregated program.1  The court specifi-
cally found that, in a mainstream program, James would bene-
fit from the opportunity to learn and interact with non-
handicapped children, to develop social skills, and to use non-
handicapped children as language models.167
On review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
declined to adopt the standard utilized by the district court.
Instead, it implicitly implemented a different balancing test.
The court held that the presumption in favor of mainstream-
ing must be weighed against the importance of providing an
appropriate education.16 It reasoned that if an appropriate
education could not be achieved in a regular classroom, then a
mainstream placement is inappropriate. 169
In applying this test, the court confined its scope of review
to the two-pronged inquiry under Rowley: First, did the state
comply with the procedural requirements of the Act? And
second, was the IEP reasonably calculated to enable the child
to receive educational benefits? 170 Furthermore, the court rec-
ognized that the Rowley decision required deference to the
expertise of school authorities on questions of methodology.
Thus, it assumed the appropriateness of the placement recom-
mended by the school authorities. The court also noted that
neither the district court nor the Briggses had identified any
support in the administrative record to substantiate the claim
that James's needs could be met in a mainstream setting; how-
ever, the court did not specify what showing would substanti-
ate such a claim.
In spite of the court of appeals' recognition that the Act
expressed a preference for mainstreaming and that the hearing
officer had properly applied the Act's mainstreaming presump-
tion, the court found that the placement team had thoroughly
evaluated James's needs.'17 Furthermore, the court found that
the state officials reached their conclusion "after careful con-
sideration by experts in the field [of] teaching the hearing-
impaired."'72 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the dis-
trict court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the
166. Id.
167. Id. at 627.
168. Briggs, 882 F.2d at 692.
169. Id. at 692.
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experts and the hearing officer. Though the court purported
to recognize the Act's preference for mainstreaming, the
court's holding appears to have completely disregarded the
Act's desire for parental input in the development of the
child's educational programs.
B. Questions and Issues Raised by Briggs
The court of appeals holding in Briggs failed to recognize
the role that Congress envisioned parents would have in devel-
oping a child's educational plan. For example, the Act pro-
vides that both schools and parents are to participate in
developing the IEP. vs Instead, the court mechanically applied
a test established by Rowley to decide an issue to which that
test was not necessarily intended to apply, namely, issues
involving placement decisions. Although the Rowley court
noted that the Act establishes a preference for mainstreaming,
it did not directly address the issue.174 Thus, any preference
for mainstreaming is not clear.
Citing Rowley, the court of appeals in Briggs deferred to
the school board's expertise on methodology and educational
policy and opted not to decide the question of mainstream
placement. In Rowley, the Supreme Court admonished courts
not to impose their own views of preferable educational meth-
ods upon the states.17  In the Supreme Court's view, courts
lack the expertise necessary to resolve educational policy
issues.176 By its deference in this instance, the court of appeals
in Briggs seems to have equated the school's choice of place-
ment with a policy decision. Leaving aside the question of
whether public school administrators are experts in educating
the deaf, the court of appeals' reluctance to disturb a school's
placement decision for fear of interfering with policy allows it
to sidestep the issue of whether the school's choice of place-
ment is likely to meet a child's needs.
It is not mandatory that the deference requirement estab-
lished by the Rowley decision be applied to issues involving
placement.177  However, perhaps courts find themselves on
173. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
174. Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202-03.
175. Id. at 207.
176. Id. at 208.
177. In Roncker, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted a standard
that inquired whether services that made a segregated facility superior could feasibly
be provided in a non-segregated setting. Roncker on behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700
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more comfortable ground when they focus on the civil rights
aspects of the Act rather than its educational goals. Moreover,
oddly neither the district court nor the court of appeals in
Briggs ever made any findings with respect to James's educa-
tional needs. Only the district court explained the manner in
which its decision was expected to impact James Briggs.
The court of appeals also stated that the Briggses failed to
substantiate their claim that James's needs could be met in a
mainstream setting. 7 9 The court was silent, however, as to the
manner in which it might weigh evidence in order to find such
a claim valid. Similarly, the court failed to indicate how par-
ents can overcome the deference the court gives to school
authorities. Moreover, that deference was stated so broadly
that it could be read to encompass virtually any course of
action that a school authority decides to take."s
Even when applying the analysis adopted by the Second
Circuit, however, it is not necessary to defer to school officials
on matters of placement. Indeed, too much deference may
tempt educators to manipulate a child's IEP to fit available
resources. If the EAHCA's mandate for free appropriate edu-
cation means anything at all, school authorities must be held to
a greater standard of accountability than they were in Briggs.
Pro forma compliance by school authorities with the proce-
dural requirements of the Act is not enough to ensure that
deaf students will receive an appropriate education.
V. CONCLUSION
The proper roles of parents and the state in the education
of children have been debated and litigated in this country for
over 60 years.'"' Application of the Education for All Handi-
F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). It is the only circuit that
has tackled the tension between LRE and "free appropriate public education" head on.
To date, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in cases demonstrating conflict
among the circuits.
178. Briggs v. Board of Education of Connecticut, 707 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D. Conn.
1988). The court expected that James "would benefit from the opportunity to learn
with nonhandicapped children in several ways, including developing social skills and
using nonhandicapped children as language models."
Although the court did not make any findings as to James's needs, the benefits the
court foresaw reflected his parents' desire that he interact with non-handicapped
children.
179. Briggs v. Board of Education of Connecticut, 882 F.2d 688, 692.
180. Id. at 693.
181. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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capped Children Act is but one aspect of this conflict. In the
case of the EAHCA, however, Congress clearly intended par-
ents to have a meaningful role in the education of their chil-
dren with special needs. To that end, Congress created the
mechanism of the IEP.
The needs of deaf children are unique. To ensure that
their needs are met under the EAHCA, courts must do more
than defer to school personnel as experts. Although since
Rowley, lower courts do not have a free hand in interpreting
the Act, there is still considerable opportunity for courts to
guarantee that the needs of individual students are met.
First, parents appealing an administrative decision under
the EAHCA should take advantage of their right to supple-
ment the record on appeal. Congress wisely provided that both
federal and state courts were to hear EAHCA appeals de
novo.18 2 Courts, for their part, should take care to decide each
case on its facts. To that end, a reviewing court should make
specific findings as to the child's needs and the ways in which
each proposed program would meet those needs.
Next, courts should provide guidance on how handicapped
students and their parents may overcome any deference the
court will grant to school officials' expertise. The sweeping
scope of deference used by the court of appeals in Briggs, for
example, seems insurmountable: Not only do the odds favor
the school authorities because of the degree of deference
granted them, but, in addition, that deference is granted on
matters of both policy and methodology. When placement is
equated to policy, as in Briggs, there is virtually no area of con-
tention left in which deference will not be granted. In the
future, parents may have to field their own experts to show
why the placement they are contesting is inappropriate. If so,
litigation will be simplified if appellate courts can provide spe-
cific criteria as to how they will regard such evidence.
Furthermore, given the conservative composition of the
current Supreme Court, it is not likely that Rowley will be
overturned, no matter how controversial its impacts on the
EAHCA. Parents of deaf children and groups such as the
Commission on Education of the Deaf will undoubtedly con-
182. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). In Briggs, the parents did not present additional
evidence on appeal. Moreover, because neither reviewing court made findings of fact,
it is far from clear how much weight was given on appeal to the administrative record.
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tinue to lobby Congress for legislation which helps meet the
specific educational needs of deaf children.
A deaf child facing public school enrollment in this coun-
try is no more than a small, still voice. Congress sought to
empower that voice when it enacted the EAHCA in 1975; it
intended that deaf and other handicapped children, and their
parents, would have some say in how those children were edu-
cated. Whether through lack of understanding or lack of
resources, some schools have failed to provide such children
and their parents a meaningful role in planning an educational
program. The courts can and must see that they do.
Suzanne J. Shaw
